EGNOS Service Provision workshop



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Aerodromes without an Instrument Runway and/or Approach Control

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Presentation Overview



- Drivers for Change
- Types of Aerodromes
- The Guidance Document
- Scope
- First Steps
- The Safety Argument
- UK Successes
- Future Work

Drivers for change















Types of UK Aerodromes





Civil Aeronautical Publication 1122



A more risk-based approach:

- Early 'Preliminary Assessment' to reduce business risk to applicant
- 2. Applicant conducts a location-specific safety assessment in support of an application for an IAP based upon alternative safety mitigations
- 3. Single CAA point of contact for applicants
- Aerodrome, Airspace and ATS all have to be satisfied a procedure can be introduced safely
- Therefore, final approval has to be assembled from across SARG



Scope – Public Transport Operations



Public Transport Operations	Approach	Aerodrome	Aerodrome	AFISO	No ATS	
	Control	Instrument	Visual		AGCS	SafetyCom
Licensed Aerodromes						
Instrument Runway	G	A1	A1	A1	R	N/A
Non- Instrument Runway	A1	A1	A1	A1	R	R
Unlicensed Aerodromes						
Non- Instrument Runway*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	R	R

GREEN Permitted at present

AMBER 1 First stage of risk-based regulatory approach, applications considered on a case-bycase basis subject to safety analysis

RED Not normally prepared to consider applications at this stage. Some may be potential areas for future consideration, following experience gained from earlier stages

^{*} Although it is conceivable that some unlicensed aerodromes may have runways which meet many of the required criteria, the absence of a licence and associated safeguarding activity, means that such runways can not be considered to be 'instrument runways'. They are therefore depicted only as 'non-instrument runways' in the table.

First steps



- 1. Early enquiry
- 2. Pre-application discussion
- 3. 1st Preliminary Review Meeting (PRM)
- 4. 2nd Review meeting & ACP
- 5. Safety Case & IAP Submission
- 6. Approval and AIRAC cycle

Baseline Safety Arguments

This table reflects the top level & safety goals which are met by our standards-based method for approval of IAPs. These and the underpinning safety statements form a baseline which describes the current way for aerodromes using approach control and a runway meeting CAP 168 'instrument runway' standards.





Goal 1.2 The risk of a runway excursion accident is acceptably low. (REXC)

Goal 1.3 The risk of a runway collision accident is acceptably low.
(RCOLL)

Goal 1.4 The risk of a mid-air collision accident is acceptably low. (MAC)

Goal 1.5 The risk of a loss of control accident is acceptably low (LOC)

Goal 1.6 The risk of an accident during the introduction to service of a new IAP at this aerodrome is acceptably low. (INTRO)

Goal 1.7 The risk of an accident during the through-life operation of an IAP at this aerodrome is acceptably low. (THRULIFE))

Candidate alternative safety arguments




The IAP at (aerodrome name) will be operated with an acceptable degree of safety Argument that the standards-based approach Argument that the provision of approach which requires Approach Control iaw ANO control iaw ANO Art 172 and/or a runway Art 172 and a runway equipped to CAP 168 equipped to full CAP 168 'instrument runway' 'instrument runway' standards, when used standards would not be reasonably practicable in combination with other risk-reduction in this case and that alternative solutions will be used in conjunction with other riskmeasures provides an acceptable degree of safety reduction measures to provide an acceptable degree of safety. Baseline Argument that the Argument that provision of Approach alternative solutions Control iaw ANO Art will be used in 172 and/or a CAP 168 combination with standard 'instrument other risk-based runway' would not be measures to provide reasonably practicable an acceptable in this case. degree of safety. Alternative Safety Arguments

Figure 2: Candidate alternative safety argument structure

UK success from 2014 call



Rigby Group 8 LPV IAPs at 4 airports



Pildo

4 PinS (or straight-in) LPV

Brighton City Airport EGKA 2 LPV IAPs

LNAV, LNAV/VNAV and LPV Status



	Runway Ends LNAV	Runway Ends LNAV/VNAV	Runway Ends LPV
In Service	38	22	6
In Design	60	12	58

Current issues




- Radar service provision outside of Controlled Airspace
 - No national coverage
 - Military not available at the weekend
 - Cost implications from civil radar units
- Separation of aircraft in Class G airspace
 - IMC conditions
 - Known environment
 - Traffic density
- Instrument traffic entering the visual circuit
 - Solo students
 - Non-radio/microlights
 - Missed approach path
- Instructions from non-ATC persons
 - Authority

Lands End new chart

	7,1	4,3	
Alrcraft (A		
OCA	LPV	717 (360)	
(OCH)	LNAV	770 (413)	
VM(C) OCA (OCH AAL)	Total Area	1040 (683)	

UNITED KINGDOM AIP AD2-EGHC-8-A

xx Mmm yyyy





CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY AIRAC AMDT XX/YYYY

AERO INFO DATE X MWW YY

Future work



Some of the aerodromes currently in discussions with CAA -

Blackbushe

Carlisle

Denham

Gamston

Redhill

Sherburn in Elmet

Wycombe

Thank you



Any questions?

